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NOTES
COMPARABLE WORTH-ITS STATUS IN THE NATION
AND MINNESOTA
Supported by staggering statistics, advocates of wage equalIty have brought the
issue of comparable worth to the forefront of employment law. Not onl is it an
issue of great legal import but one of great political, economic, and social import as
well. Notwithstanding the recognized importance of wage equality, countervailing
interests have hindered the acceptance of comparable worth by the judiciaq. This
Note examines the j'udiciary's reluctance to address the issue and legislative
responses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act' and Title V112 over twenty years
ago, but two decades of technical equality have failed to adjust the gross
disparities between men's and women's wages. Since 1939, a woman has
earned roughly fifty-nine cents for every dollar earned by a man. 3 Even
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); see infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text (legislative
history and judicial interpretations of Equal Pay Act).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see inJa notes 35-59 and
accompanying text (partial text, legislative history, historical background, and judicial
interpretations of Title VII).
3. St. Paul Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1982, at 7C, col. 1; f Lauter, Pay Bias Enters New Age,
Nat'l L.J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (women earn on the average 61€ for every dollar men
earn). The national average salary for male typists is $15,566. Females in this position
earn $10,615. Male computer specialists earn $24,563; females, $16,437. USA Today,
1
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in the same industry and occupation, with adjustments for experience
and education, a woman's wages are, on the average, thirty percent less
than those of her male counterpart. 4 One of the reasons for this disparity
is the high concentration of women in lower paying, unskilled jobs.5
More significant is the high percentage of women employed in female-
dominated jobs.6 The lack of male counterparts working in the same job
precludes those women from the protection provided by the Equal Pay
Act standards.
7
Comparable worth may be an answer to this dilemma. Instead of re-
quiring equal pay for equal work, comparable worth seeks equal pay for
comparable work. In other words, employees in different jobs requiring
equal skill, effort, and responsibility should be paid equally since their
jobs are of equal value to a common employer.8
In recent years, comparable worth has become a controversial issue in
the area of wage and sex discrimination. The issue arises in several con-
texts, including complaints, grievances, public debates, litigation, and
Sept. 30, 1982, at 10A, col. I. In New York City, a public school teacher, typically female,
with a master's degree earns an entry level salary of $12,979 while a sanitation worker,
typically male, earns $14,075 without a high school diploma. A teacher with a bachelor's
degree earns $10,981 in New York City while police officers and fire fighters earn $15,619,
often with only a high school diploma. Labor. What's ajob Worth., ATLANTIc, Feb. 1981,
at 10. Approximately 22.2% of the civil service employees of the City of Minneapolis,
Minnesota are women. Two-thirds of these women are clerical employees. Most men
employed by the City of Minneapolis earn between $25,000 and $33,000 annually while
most women earn between $16,000 and $19,900. The female-dominated job of emergency
communications specialist pays from $637 to $907 bi-weekly while the male-dominated
job of equipment dispatcher pays from $899 to $1139. See St. Paul Dispatch, Aug. 19,
1983, at IB, col. 6.
4. St. Paul Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1982, at 7C, col. 1; see also Quinn, Comparable Pay for
Women, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1984, at 66 (even after corrections for differences in tenure
and training, women on the average earn less than men).
5. St. Paul Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1982, at 7C, col. 1. In the ten highest paying jobs for
women, only 25% of the workers are female. In low-paying, female-dominated jobs such
as cashier, women earn 90% of what a man earns. Id. at col. 3.
6. Seventy-three percent of working women are employed in female-dominated jobs.
Comment, Equal Pay for Comparable Work Value: The Failure of Title VIIand the Equal Pay Act,
75 Nw. U.L. REV. 914, 916 (1980).
7. Id. at 916.
8. See generally Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title
VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 Duo. L. REv. 453, 470 (1981)
(issue is whether Congress intended Title VII to outlaw greater compensation of male jobs
than female jobs if the reason for the pay differential is attributable to the sex of the
employee); Schnebly, Comparable worth: a legal oveview, PERSONNEL AD., April 1982, at 43
(comparable worth defined: jobs having equal value to the organization should be equally
compensated, whether or not the work content of those jobs is similar). Comparable
worth is more complicated than the equal pay for equal work theory. If a job requires the
same level of skill, education and responsibility as a different job, then workers in each job
should be paid the same. See Nussbaum, Why pay secretay less than a go-fer?, USA Today,
Sept. 30, 1982, at 10A, col. 3.
[Vol. 10
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legislative initiatives. 9 Those who support implementation of compara-
ble worth believe it will help eradicate job segregation. Arguably, if the
pay for female-dominated jobs were made equal to the pay for male-
dominated jobs of comparable value, more men would pursue work in
traditionally femalejobs.10 Advocates of comparable worth contend that
existing constitutional, I statutory,12 and judicial's protections are inade-
quate to ensure wage equality.14 Opponents of comparable worth argue
that equal pay for equal worth is too difficult and costly to implement. '5
An estimated one hundred and fifty billion dollars per year may be nec-
essary to increase full-time female workers' wages to that of full-time
male workers.16 These opponents charge that comparable worth will de-
stroy the free market system.'7 They argue that existing law is adequate
and that Congress expressly rejected the notion of comparable worth
9. See WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES: EQUAL PAY FOR JOBS OF EQUAL VALUE I (D.
Treiman & H. Hartmann eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN, WORK, AND WAGES].
10. See Norton, Women are trapped in low-paying jobs, USA Today, Sept. 30, 1982, at
10A, col. 6 (women are trying to fill traditional male jobs but few men want to enter
traditionally female fields). Two-thirds of women workers are employed in sales, service,
or clerical jobs where the pay is low, few skills are required, and opportunities for promo-
tion are limited. This is known as occupational segregation. See Gasaway, Comparable
Worth. A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEO. L.J. 1123, 1126 (1981).
11. See generally infa notes 23-27 and accompanying text. The effect of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment on women's wages may never be known. The ratification
deadline was June 30, 1982. For a general background and history of the ERA, see Dow,
Sexual Equality, the ERA and the Court-A Tale of Two Failures, 13 N.M.L. REV. 53 (1983).
12. See generally infra notes 28-59 and accompanying text.
13. See generally inftfa notes 60-133 and accompanying text.
14. Statistics illustrate the need for protecting working women. Recent figures indi-
cate that 63% of Americans living below the poverty level are women. St. Paul Pioneer
Press, Oct. 11, 1982, at 8A, col. 1. In recent years, more women have become single par-
ents with little or no support from an ex-husband or absent father. Sixty percent of work-
ing women provide the sole or vital support for themselves and their families. Women
head one of ten households and one-third of all households below the poverty level are
headed by women. If working women are to be accepted socially as the sole providers for
their families, then they should earn as much as a male head of household would earn for
performing work of comparable value. See Gasaway, supra note 10.
15. See McDowell, Comparable worth opens Pandora's box, USA Today, Sept. 30, 1982, at
10A, col. 6. Douglas S. McDowell, a Washington lawyer specializing in equal employ-
ment law, argues, "Adoption of the comparable worth approach would involve the courts
and the government in a tangle of issues that would be difficult to resolve, and almost
impossible to manage." Id at col. 7.
16. See Barnett, The "Comparable Worth" Doctrine and the Implications of County of Wash-
ington v. Gunther, FED. B. NEWS &J., Sept. 1981, at 183; see also McDowell,supra note 15
(comparable worth would be extremely costly if applied to entire industries).
17. See Spelfogel, Equal Pay for Work of Comparable Value. A New Concept 32 LAB. L.J.
30, 39 (1981). Opponents fear comparable worth could permanently damage market pric-
ing concepts. They argue increased wages would result in increased costs. Increased costs
would in turn require increased productivity through automation and job loss. Increased
prices of goods and services would hamper America's ability to compete with foreign la-
bor. Thus, it is claimed that comparable worth "would deal a devastating and perhaps
fatal blow to collective bargaining and the free enterprise system as we know it." Id
19841
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when it enacted legislation affecting pay equity.18
In July 1983, Minnesota's largest public employees' union signed a
two-year contract with the state of Minnesota to increase wages of
thousands of state employees.19 Earlier in 1983, pursuant to Minnesota's
state employees-equitable compensation statute, 20 the Minnesota Legis-
lature appropriated nearly twenty-two million dollars to make this in-
crease possible. 2 t By integrating comparable worth into its statutory
scheme, Minnesota became a pioneer in the area of pay equity.
22
This Note explores the judicial and legislative sources of comparable
worth, the theory's status in the courts and state legislatures, and
problems hindering its further implementation. A discussion of existing
wage discrimination law is a necessary prerequisite to understanding the
roots of comparable worth.
II. FEDERAL STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Congress and Wage Discrnmination
State action which discriminates on the basis of sex has only recently
been recognized as unconstitutional. The fourteenth amendment, 23 en-
acted in 1868, provides the constitutional authority for prohibiting vari-
ous forms of discrimination. The amendment mandates that "No State
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."24 It was not until the early 1970's that the Supreme Court
determined that sex was an inherently suspect classification triggering
18. See tinfa note 34.
19. See St. Paul Pioneer Press, July 26, 1983, at IA, col. 5. The American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) bargains for 17,000 state govern-
ment employees, including 85% of Minnesota's female government employees. Consul-
tants assigned a certain worth rating to each state government job category. Wages were
increased 4% on July 1, 1983, and will be increased 4 1/2% in 1984 for female-dominated
job categories with worth ratings similar to those of male-dominated job categories. Over
7000 employees, including over 5000 women, are affected. Id.
20. See MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.01-.47 (1982). See generall infra notes 161-71 and accom-
panying text (examination of statute).
21. See Act of June 8, 1983, ch. 301, § 55, 1983 Minn. Laws 1558, 1622-24. Eighteen
million dollars was targeted toward employees represented by AFSCME. Complete pay
equity, however, is not expected unless a similar appropriation is made in 1985. See St.
Paul Pioneer Press, July 26, 1983, at IA, col. 5.
22. See St. Paul Pioneer Press, July 26, 1983, at IA, col. 5. AFSCME negotiated pay
equity adjustments in Hennepin County, Minnesota. See Quinn, Comparable Pay for Wo-
men, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 16, 1984, at 66. In early 1984, AFSCME and other labor unions
agreed with the City of St. Paul, Minnesota to conduct a study to determine whether men
and women employees are being paid equally for comparable work. The results of the
study could result in increased wages for the women represented by AFSCME. See St.
Paul Pioneer Press, Jan. 6, 1984, at IC, col. 6.
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close judicial scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment. 25 To be en-
forceable, any state classification based on sex must now be substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental objective.26
Since the fourteenth amendment applies only to state action, private dis-
crimination is not prohibited.
27
Congress passed the Equal Pay Act of 196328 (EPA) approximately
one hundred years after the enactment of the fourteenth amendment.
The EPA, which is binding upon private employers, amended the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.29 A private employer subject to the EPA30
may not pay female employees less than male employees who work in the
same3' or a substantially similar job.32 The Equal Pay Act defines equal
25. Set Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S 677, 682 (1973). In Frontiero, the Court de-
parted from traditional rational basis analysis and held that "classifications based upon
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently sus-
pect, and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny." Id at 688; cf. Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (discriminatory statute struck down using rational basis stan-
dard, a test more easily satisfied than the standard in Frontiero).
26. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (differentiating between males and
females regarding age at which they may buy 3.2% beer held not to meet standard); see
also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S 455, 459 (1981).
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall.., deny to any person within
its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." Id. (emphasis added).
28. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)(1) (1976)). The Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides in full:
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall
discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed,
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such
establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of
the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant
to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any
other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage
rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with
the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis in original).
29. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).
30. To be subject to this act, an employer must fall under the criteria found at 29
U.S.C. § 203(s) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (definition of enterprise engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce).
31. See Equal Pay Act of 1963, supra note 28 (standard used in text of Equal Pay Act
is equal pay for equal work).
32. Jobs need not be identical before the Equal Pay Act is applicable. Equal work
means substantially equal. A wage differential is permissible only if it compensates for an
appreciable variation in skill, effort, or responsibility between otherwise comparable job
work activities. At the time of this publication, every circuit court of appeals that has
decided the question has adopted the substantial similarity standard. See, e.g., Thompson
v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 272 (D.D.C. 1982); Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250
(6th Cir. 1981); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kenosha Unified School
Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d 1220, 1225 (7th Cir. 1980); Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 713
(8th Cir. 1980); Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979),
1984]
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work as "jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions. . . ." 33 Courts have interpreted the Equal Pay Act to apply only
to employee allegations of unequal pay for equal or substantially similar
work, not to employee allegations of unequal pay for comparable work.3 4
Soon after the enactment of the EPA, Congress passed Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 a comprehensive series of federal statutes
prohibiting various forms of discrimination, including discrimination on
the basis of sex. The Act was passed on July 2, 1964, during the height of
the civil rights movement in the late 1950's and early 1960's. This legis-
lation was prompted by the need to eradicate one hundred years of racial
discrimination.36 The issue of sex discrimination was not addressed until
the day before the Act's passage.3 7 The debate over inclusion of sex as a
form of discrimination lasted two hours. Following the vote, the word
"sex" was inserted in Title VII wherever the categories of "race, color,
religion, or national origin" appeared.38
The inclusion of "sex" in Title VII, commonly referred to as the Smith
Amendment, 39 was not the only last-minute change. The Bennett
afid, 452 U.S 161 (1981); Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 861
(10th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 1973), affd
sub noma. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974); Hodgson v. Fairmont
Supply Co., 454 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1972); Hodgson v. Brookhaven Gen. Hosp., 436
F.2d 719, 724 (5th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
34. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 168 (1981) (Equal Pay
Act restricted to cases involving equal work). Congress rejected the comparable worth
standard when it authorized the EPA. See generally Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 501
F. Supp. 1300, 1308-09 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (discussing legislative history of EPA and Con-
gress's rejection of comparable worth); Thomas, Pay Equity and Comparable Worth, 34 LAB.
L.J. 3, 4-5 (1983) (history of comparable worth since World War II).
35. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, §§ 701-
716, 78 Stat. 253-266 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). The unlawful employment practices section provides in part that "[i]t
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation . . . because of such individual's ... sex
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976) (emphasis added).
36. For general background on the civil rights movement, see R. BLEIWEISS, MARCH-
ING TO FREEDOM-THE LIFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. (1969); A. HAIG & H. Bos-
MAJIAN, THE RHETORIC OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1969); D. LEWIS, KING: A
CRITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1970).
37. See 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2513-17 (legislative history and purpose
of Title VII); see also Gold, supra note 8, at 462-68; Miller, Sex Discrimination and Ttle VII of
the CivilRightsActof 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 879-85 (1967). One of the main reasons
"sex" was inserted was the fear that black women would have more rights than white
women. Id at 882.
38. See Miller, supra note 37, at 882.
39. See Gold, supra note 8, at 462-63; Miller, supra note 37, at 880-81.
[Vol. 10
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Amendment 4° also was added to Title VII immediately before Senate
approval and return of the bill to the House.4' It became another fed-
eral statute important to the evolution of comparable worth. The Ben-
nett Amendment reads:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter
for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining
the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees
of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions
of section 206(d) of Title 29.42
Federal wage discrimination claims led some courts to hold that the
Bennett Amendment incorporated the entire EPA into Title VII. This
conclusion meant that a woman's Title VII wage discrimination claim
would be limited by the EPA's equal pay for equal work standards. 43 In
1981, this interpretation was rejected by the Supreme Court in County of
Washington v. Gunther. 44 The Court declared that the Bennett Amend-
ment merely incorporated into Title VII the four exceptions listed in the
EPA.45 These exceptions allow an employer to differentiate between
men's and women's wages "where such payment is made pursuant to (i)
a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earn-
ings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on
any. . . factor other than sex. .. *"46 According to the Gunther Court,
Title VII wage discrimination actions were not limited by the equal pay
for equal work standard of the EPA.47
Since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Court has devel-
oped three methods of establishing discrimination under Title VII: dis-
parate treatment, disparate impact, and pattern or practice of
discrimination.48 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green49 set forth the four ele-
ments that a complainant must plead and prove to establish a prima
facie disparate treatment claim. The complainant must show that she
belonged to a class protected under Title VII; that she applied and quali-
40. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, title VII, § 703,
78 Stat. 255 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976)).
41. See Gold, supra note 8, at 471.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). Section 206(d) of Title 29 is the Equal Pay Act,
supra note 28.
43. See, e.g., Nuif v. International Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 560 (10th Cir. 1981) (cit-
ing Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117, 119 (10th Cir. 1971)) (Bennett Amendment made
equal pay for equal work standard applicable to Title VII); Lemons v. City of Denver, 620
F.2d 228, 229-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980) (same result as Nul).
44. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
45. See id at 168-71.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
47. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171; see also EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29
C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1982) (relationship of Title VII to Equal Pay Act).
48. See infra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
49. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The issue in McDonnell was the "order and allocation of
proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination." Id at 800.
19841
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fled for a job for which the employer was seeking applications; that she
was rejected; and that the position remained open while the employer
accepted more applications from people with the complainant's qualifi-
cations.50 According to the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 51 disparate treatment occurs when an employer
treats some people less favorably than others on the basis of gender.52
Proof of a discriminatory motive is essential, although it is sometimes
inferred from differences in treatment. 53
Disparate impact claims arise in situations where employment prac-
tices are fair in form, but discriminatory in practice.54 Once the com-
plainant proves that a practice neutral in appearance has, in effect,
significantly harsher consequences for women, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove that the discrimination is necessary to serve a legiti-
mate business purpose. 55 Evidence of a discriminatory motive is not es-
sential to proving such claims.56
When a complainant pleads a claim based on a pattern or practice of
discrimination, the issue is whether such a pattern or practice of dispa-
rate treatment indeed existed and, if so, whether the discrimination was
sexually premised.57 Once a complainant establishes the existence of a
disparate, sexually premised pattern or practice, a presumption arises
that the complainant was discriminated against and thus may be entitled
to relief.58 The burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the
practice was not based on a policy of discrimination.59
50. Id at 802. Although McDonnell involved racial discrimination, prima facie race
and sex discrimination cases are analogous. See, e.g., Mead v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 442 F. Supp. 114, 129 (D. Minn. 1977) (McDonnell test used in case involving
sex discrimination in employment); cf Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d
428, 441-42 (Minn. 1983) (McDonnell test applied where plaintiff alleged discriminatory
discharge); Fisher Nut Co. v. Lewis ex re. Garcia, 320 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Minn. 1982) (race
discrimination claim under city ordinance governed by standards developed under Title
VII); Minnesota Chem. Dependency Ass'n v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil Rights, 310
N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn. 1981) (McDonnell test, as developed in Danz v. Jones, 263 N.W.2d
395 (Minn. 1978), used where plaintiff alleged sexual preference discrimination in employ-
ment); Kaster v. Independent School Dist. No. 625, 284 N.W.2d 362, 364-65 (Minn. 1979)
(McDonnell test used in case involving religious discrimination in employment).
51. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
52. Id at 335 n.15.
53. See id. "[D]isparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind
when it enacted Title VII." Id (citations omitted).
54. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
55. Cf id (6n'ggs involved race, not sex discrimination); Note, Business Necessiy Under
Tile VII of The Ciil Rights Act of 1964 A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 99-102
(1974) (discriminatory practice justified when employer shows that use of practice benefits
business).
56. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
57. Cf Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 (Teamsters involved a claim of racial discrimination).
58. See Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1981).
59. Id (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 362).
[Vol. 10
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B. The Federal Judciaty and Comparable Worth. A Survey of Cases
The use of comparable worth to establish sex discrimination is a rela-
tively new trend in the federal courts. Although the number of compara-
ble worth cases has increased significantly in the last few years, plaintiffs
generally have not fared well.6° The lack of acceptance of comparable
worth in the courts is attributable largely to the absence of favorable case
law and the difficulties faced by plaintiffs in proving their claims.6 '
I. Early Comparable Worth Cases
Only a handful of landmark United States circuit court cases provide
any precedent for comparable worth. In response to a charge of wage
discrimination under Title VII, the Eighth Circuit in Christensen v. Iowa
6 2
stated that Title VII was not intended to abrogate the laws of supply and
demand or to ignore economic realities. 6 3 The plaintiffs in Christensen
were a class of female clerical workers employed by the University of
Northern Iowa (UNI) who sued the Iowa State Board of Regents and the
state of Iowa for violations of Title VII.64 They contended that the de-
fendants paid UNI's all female clerical staff less than the largely male
physical plant workers. 65 The plaintiffs asserted that these jobs were of
equal value to UNI.66
The defendants argued that, because of the Bennett Amendment, any
wage discrimination claim under Title VII must be brought under an
60. But see American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Emps. v. State of Washington,
578 F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (first successful comparable worth case decided in
federal court). See generally WOMEN, WORK & WAGES, supra note 9, at 1-3 (discussing
trend toward comparable worth litigation).
61. In Oaks v. City of Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. Ala. 1981), the court refused
to adopt comparable worth. The court noted that the Fifth Circuit had neither accepted
nor rejected the theory and that an almost identical claim had been considered and re-
jected in Lemons v. City of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888
(1980). See Oaks, 515 F. Supp. at 1040; see also tnfra notes 73-80 and accompanying text
(discussion of Lemons case). The Oaks court went on to state that even if it were to adopt
comparable worth, plaintiff's claim would fail because her position as a librarian was not
comparable to the city department head positions as she had contended. 515 F. Supp. at
1040. In Gerlach v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 501 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Mich. 1980),
the court held that Title VII wage discrimination claims were not limited by Equal Pay
Act standards. Gerlach, 501 F. Supp. at 1319. The Gerlash court noted that it was possible
for comparable worth to be used as relevant evidence in a wage discrimination case, but
rejected comparable worth as the sole basis for an independent cause of action. Id at
1321.
62. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977). For further discussion of Christensen, see Comment,
Sex-Based Wage Discrinination Claims After County of Washington v. Gunther, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1333, 1343 (1981).
63. 563 F.2d at 356; see also infra notes 190-213 and accompanying text (discussion of
marketplace as defense to comparable worth claims).
64. 563 F.2d at 354.
65. Id
66. Id at 354-55.
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equal pay for equal work theory.6 7 The court, however, did not reach
this argument because the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie sex
discrimination case under Title VII.68 UNI based its wage scales on lo-
cal labor market factors69 such as the supply of workers, the ability of
workers to unionize, the value of the job, and the wage scales of similar
workers in the community.70 According to the court, any disparity in
wages was due to the nature of the job and not to the sex of the em-
ployee. 71 The plaintiffs also were unable to use Equal Pay Act standards
to show a substantial similarity between their jobs and those with higher
pay.
72
In Lemons v. City & County of Denver73 several female nurses employed by
the city of Denver alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 74
The plaintiffs argued that, historically, nurses have been underpaid due
to sex discrimination. Thus, Denver's effort to pay nurses the same wages
as other nurses in the community incorporated historical discrimination
into the city's salary standard. The plaintiffs contended that the city
should pay its nurses the same as other jobs that were of internal equal
worth to the city of Denver.75
Following Christensen, the Tenth Circuit found in Lemons that "plain-
tiffs did not show that the work in the classification they sought was
equal to that in which they found themselves." 76 The court held that
Denver was merely required to provide equal opportunities to anyone
seeking employment with the city.77 As long as Denver acted in good
faith, no violation could be found. 78 Denver's pay scales reflected condi-
67. Id at 355.
68. Id
69. Id at 354.
70. Id The evidence showed UNI paid physical plant workers more than necessary
under the Board of Regent's pay scheme, the Hayes System, which was based on internal
job worth. UNI justified higher pay to physical plant workers with the wages paid in the
local labor market. Id at 354-55.
71. Id at 355.
72. Id at 356.
73. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
74. Id
75. Id at 229.
76. Id at 230. The court found that the parity sought was not an available remedy
under existing case law, statutory law, or the Constitution. Id at 229-30.
77. Id at 230. The goal of the pay plan was to equalize the city worker's pay with
pay for identical jobs in the community. Therefore, the complainant city nurses were paid
the same as other nurses in the area. This method was used for all city job classifications.
Id at 229.
78. Id at 229. The court stated it could only consider wage discrimination claims
involving disparate pay for equal work because the Bennett Amendment applied the
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tions in the community, 79 and any relief for a comparable worth claim
was beyond the court's power.80
In International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.,81 a federal appeals court almost sanctioned a compa-
rable worth action. The plaintiffs, female workers at Westinghouse,
claimed that since the 1930's, the defendant had deliberately set lower
wage rates for predominantly female jobs.82 The 1930's wage structure
classified jobs by sex. Westinghouse paid female workers less than male
workers in jobs with the same point rating.83 In 1965, Westinghouse es-
tablished the contested wage structure which eliminated the sex classifi-
cations but retained the same point ratings.84 The Third Circuit found
Westinghouse's wage structure to be intentional wage discrimination vio-
lative of Title VII.85
The Third Circuit was unconcerned that Westinghouse did not involve
an equal pay for equal work claim. Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Lemons,
the Westinghouse court held only that the Bennett Amendment incorpo-
rated the four Equal Pay Act standards into Title VII.86 The court dis-
tinguished the wage structure used in Lemons, which was based on job
classifications rather than sex classifications. 8 7 In Westinghouse, the court
found that the wages for different jobs were determined solely by the sex
of the employees.8 8
2. County of Washington v. Gunther
The recent increase in litigation of comparable worth cases is due
mainly to the Supreme Court's decision in County of Washington v. Gun-
ther. 89 The respondents in Gunther were four female prison guards in the
79. 620 F.2d at 229. Traditionally lower pay for nurses was found to be the likely
consequence of past attitudes, practices, and supply and demand. Id
80. Id
81. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 967 (1981).
82. Id at 1096.
83. Id at 1097. There were three steps to Westinghouse's point-rating system. First,
the company assigned a numerical value to jobs based on the knowledge, required train-
ing, responsibilities, and demands of the job. Second, the company graded jobs according
to the point rating. Third, the company set hourly wages at each labor grade. Id.
84. Id The district court granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment
reasoning that sex-based discrimination in compensation violates Title VII only if it also
violates the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Id at 1098. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the district court's reasoning and remanded the case for a new trial. Id
at 1108.
85. Id at 1097.
86. Id at 1101. The court based this finding on the plain language of the statute. d.
at 1100-01. The court also concluded that this incorporation did not limit wage discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII. d at 1101.
87. Id at 1107.
88. Id at 1097.
89. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). Gunther has received extensive discussion. See, e.g., Note,
Proving Title VII Sex-Based Wage Dircrnmznation After County of Washington v. Gunther, 4
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women's section of the petitioner's county jail.90 The women alleged
that they were paid less than their male counterparts in the men's section
of the jail in direct violation of Title VII.91 They maintained that their
work was substantially equal to that of the male guards and, alterna-
tively, that this pay differential was due to intentional discrimination.
92
The Court addressed the issue of whether the respondents' comparable
worth claims were barred by the Bennett Amendment. 93 The Court held
that the pay differentials falling within one of the four exceptions listed
in the EPA were not actionable under Title VII.94 Although the Court
stressed that Gunther was not a comparable worth case, it briefly discussed
the issue.95 According to the Court, a comparable worth claim is present
under Title VII if plaintiffs allege "increased compensation on the basis
of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of their jobs with that
of other jobs in the same organization or community."96 By holding that
wage discrimination charges under Title VII need not be limited to EPA
standards, the Court did not preclude comparable worth actions under
Title VII.9
7
CARDOZO L. REV. 281 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Note, Proving Title]; Note, County of
Washington v. Gunther: Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Extends Beyond the Equal Pay Act, 16
Loy. L.A.L. REV. 151, 167-71 (1983); Note, Women, Wages, and Title VII. The S'gniftance of
County of Washington v. Gunther, 43 U. PIT. L. REv. 467, 477-78 (1981); Comment,
Thie VII Comparable Worth Claims. Ana ysis of Liability, Proof, Defenses, and Remedies For Sex-
Based Wage Discrimination, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685 passim (1981).
90. 452 U.S. at 164.
91. Id. The lower courts held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to equal pay be-
cause their work required less prisoner supervision and more clerical work than the male
guards' work. 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 788, 791 (1976). This finding was not
appealed. The Ninth Circuit held, 602 F.2d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 623 F.2d
1303, 1317 (1980), and the Supreme Court agreed, 452 U.S. at 165-66, that part of the
wage differential was due to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
92. 452 U.S. at 164.
93. Id at 166; see also supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (background and text
of Bennett Amendment).
94. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 171; see supra note 46 and accompanying text (four exceptions
to Equal Pay Act).
95. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 166. The court stressed that it was not deciding whether the
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII. Id at
166.
96. Id at 166 (footnote omitted).
97. See Bartelt v. Berlitz School of Languages, Inc., 698 F.2d 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir.
1983) (Gunther read to mean that Title VII covers sex-based wage discrimination claims
despite coverage under Equal Pay Act standards); Francoeur v. Carroon & Black Co., 552
F. Supp. 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (applies Gunther to hold that Title VII wage discrimina-
tion claim need not be determined on finding of equal or substantially equal work); Note,
Proving Title, supra note 89, at 318 (since Gunther, prima facie Title VII wage discrimina-
tion claim not limited to proof of man receiving higher wages for equal work); ef Kahn,
Bennett Amendment-Reaching beyond equal pay to encompass the doctrine of comparable worth, 56
FLA. B.J. 843 (1982) (analysis of differences between wage discrimination claims under
Equal Pay Act and Title VII in light of Gunther).
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The Court based its holding for respondents on a finding of intentional
discrimination by the petitioner.98 The Court observed that the county
had determined female guards should be paid ninety-five percent as
much as male guards. Nevertheless, the women were paid only seventy
percent as much as the male guards.99 This disparity was found to be
due to intentional sex discrimination.100
3. Post-Gunther Cases
Since the Supreme Court decided Gunther, most comparable worth
claimants have been unsuccessful in the relatively small number of cases
that have reached the federal courts.' 0 ' In Brggs v. City of Madison, 102
eighteen female public health nurses sued the city of Madison alleging
that the city had discriminated against them in violation of Title VII by
paying them less than the city's all male public health sanitarians.103
The court found that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case of sex
discrimination.104 The plaintiffs proved that:
(1) they [were] members of a protected class (2) occupying a sex-segre-
gated job classification (3) that [was] paid less than a (4) sex-segregated
job classification occupied by men and (5) that the two job classifica-
tions at issue [were] so similar in their requirements of skill, effort, and
responsibility, and working conditions that it [could] reasonably be in-
ferred that they [were] of comparable value to an employer.
1 0 5
The city, however, successfully rebutted the plaintiffs' prima facie
98. Gunther, 452 U.S. at 180-81.
99. Id at 180.
100. Id at 180-81. The dissenters argued that Title VII guarantees equal pay for men
and women in the same jobs. The dissent contended that the Bennett Amendment was
unnecessary because Congress intended the equal work standard to be used in Title VII
cases as well as in Equal Pay Act cases. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell in a lengthy dissent. Id at 181-204.
101. See generaly Recent Developments, Comparable Worth, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 201,
202-06 (1983) (courts are unwilling to recognize comparable worth because of difficulties
in formulating standards and reluctance to interfere with labor market); Thomas, supra
note 34, at 6-7 (comparable worth claims are harder to prove than traditional sex discrimi-
nation claims because they involve sophisticated and expensive analyses).
102. 536 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Wis. 1982).
103. Id at 437. The duties of public health nurses included providing nursing services
in the community, educating the public, and enforcing certain local and state health rules.
The duties of sanitarians included inspection of public establishments such as restaurants,
supermarkets, hotels and schools for compliance with the applicable health and safety
rules, review of plans for private sewage systems, and investigation of complaints regard-
ing the environment and food-related illnesses. Id. at 438.
104. Id at 445. The court noted that plaintiffs' claim was not brought under the
Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976), since plaintiffs did not allege equal or substan-
tially similar work. Instead, plaintiffs' disparate treatment claim alleged wage discrimina-
tion in sex-segregated jobs of comparable content. Id at 442.
105. Id at 445 (emphasis added). In the alternative, plaintiffs alleged that evidence of
(1) through (4) was a sufficient prima facie showing. In rejecting this alternative, the court
concluded that no inference of an unlawful employment practice under Title VII could be
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showing with proof that it needed to pay the sanitarians more to compete
with salaries of sanitarians in the local labor market.' 0 6 The court found
that under Title VII an employer was liable only for its own discrimina-
tory acts and not the discriminatory acts of the marketplace. 0 7 The
plaintiffs then failed to prove that the city's reasons for the pay differen-
tials were pretextual. t08 The court granted judgment on the merits for
the city.10 9
In Power v. Barry County, Michigan, 110 the court flatly rejected compara-
ble worth as a valid theory under Title VII.1 I I The court found that the
Supreme Court did not sanction comparable worth in Gunther' 12 and
that since that decision, federal courts have either adopted Gunther's in-
tentional discrimination theory or adhered to traditional Title VII analy-
sis.11 3 The court expressed its inability and unwillingness to evaluate the
worth of jobs when presented with a wage and sex discrimination claim
under Title VII or the Equal Pay Act."
t 4
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Hay Associates, 115 the court
drawn because this formulation did not eliminate a common nondiscriminatory reason for
pay disparities: differences in skill, effort, and responsibility. Id at 443-44.
106. Id. at 446-47. At trial, the city had produced evidence of other government em-
ployers in the state paying higher wages to their sanitarians. To combat recruitment and
retention problems and to be competitive in the state's labor market, the city twice raised
the pay for its sanitarians. Id at 446.
107. Id at 447. The court stated that an abundance of qualified applicants for certain
jobs and a shortage of qualified applicants for other jobs was not the responsibility of a
particular employer. Id
108. Id at 448-49. The court suggested that plaintiffs might have countered defend-
ant's proof with evidence regarding the general supply of sanitarians and public health
nurses in the labor market during the years in question. Specifically, plaintiff might have
produced evidence of the number of potential sanitarian recruits, the number of appli-
cants for vacant sanitarian positions, and the length of time it took to fill a vacant sanitar-
ian position. Id at 448.
109. Id at 450.
110. 539 F. Supp. 721 (W.D. Mich. 1982). Plaintiffs were a group of women employed
by the Barry County Sheriff's department as "matrons" for county prisoners. Plaintiffs
alleged that defendants had discriminated against them by paying them less than the
county's all-male staff of "correction officers." Plaintiffs contended that both jobs were of
comparable worth to Barry County and that both jobs required equal work. Id at 721-22.
111. See id at 726-27. The court found no federal court decisions that sanctioned com-
parable worth and no supportive legislative history in the area of wage discrimination. Id
at 722-26.
112. Id at 724. The court based this finding on the Supreme Court's caveat in Gunther
that the respondents' allegations were not based on comparable worth. Id; see supra notes
89-100 and accompanying text (discussion of Gunther decision).
113. 539 F. Supp. at 724.
114. Id at 726-27. The court stated that it would be too difficult to subjectively evalu-
ate the intrinsic worth of different jobs. Id The court granted defendants' motion to
dismiss the portion of plaintiffs' complaint alleging a cause of action based on comparable
worth. Id at 727.
115. 545 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1982). The EEOC brought this action under Title
VII alleging various instances of sex discrimination by defendant against Joann Bay. Bay
[Vol. 10
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found that comparable worth claims were valid under Title VII in light
of Gunther. 116 The court found it unnecessary to define the elements of a
comparable worth claim because the claimant did not present enough
evidence for the court to infer that her job was comparable to the male
employees' jobs. 117
In December 1983, a United States district court judge in Washington
ruled in favor of the complainants in the first successful comparable
worth case decided in federal court.I l a The plaintiffs in American Federa-
tion of State, County, and Municipal Employees v. State of Washington t1 9
(AFSCME) were a class of male and female state employees who had
worked or were working in positions that were at least seventy percent
female.' 2 0 The plaintiffs challenged the state of Washington's failure to
compensate women according to the state's own determination of their
worth.12 ' In 1974, the state hired a consulting firm to study the wages
paid to state government employees.' 2 2 The study concluded that wo-
men employed by the state were paid twenty percent less than their
worth in comparison with wages paid to men employed by the state. t2 3
The state legislature did nothing to remedy this acknowledged disparity
until after the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit.124 The court held that the state
of Washington was maintaining a compensation system which discrimi-
nated on the basis of sex.' 25 The court awarded the relief requested by
later intervened and filed a complaint alleging unequal pay for comparable work under
Title VII and unequal pay for equal work under the Equal Pay Act. Id at 1067-68. The
court found that Bay made a prima facie showing of an Equal Pay Act violation since
defendant paid her less than a male performing substantially similar work. Id. at 1083.
Bay also established prima facie showings of sex discrimination in promotion and con-
structive discharge. Id at 1082, 1086.
116. Id at 1085. The court offered no discussion of comparable worth beyond a cur-
sory recognition of such claims. Id
117. Id;seesupra note 116.
118. See American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Emps. v. State of Washington, 578
F. Supp. 846 (W.D. Wash. 1983).
119. Id
120. Id at 871.
121. Id at 865.
122. Id. at 861. The purpose of the study was "'to examine and identify salary differ-
ences that may pertain to job classes predominantly filled by men compared to job classes
predominantly filled by women, based on job worth.'" Id
123. Id
124. Id. at 867. In 1976, the state retained the same consulting firm to do an update of
the 1974 study. The purpose of the 1976 study was to " 'establish a program leading to
implementation of the comparable worth study completed in September 1974.' " Id at
861. In 1976, Washington's former Governor Evans appropriated seven million dollars to
begin implementation of comparable worth. In 1977, his successor, Governor Ray took
the appropriation out of the budget. Id. at 862.
125. Id. at 867. The court noted that:
[I]t is indeed ironic and tragic that the State of Washington is in the eighth
decade of the Twentieth Century attempting to use the American legal system to
sanction, uphold and perpetuate sex bias. Defendants are struggling to maintain
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the plaintiffs which included issuance of a declaratory judgment, injunc-
tive relief, increased wages, back pay, and fringe benefits.12 6
The ,4FSCME decision will affect approximately 15,000 state employ-
ees holding "women's jobs."' 127 It has been estimated that the total set-
tlement could reach one billion dollars.128 In response to this decision,
the president of AFSCME estimated that 83,000 public jurisdictions in
the United States could be affected.129 The state of Washington, how-
ever, predicted that the effect of the court's order would devastate the
state's economy. 130 An appeal is expected to delay the implementation
of the court's order.
13
The foregoing cases appear to have established a trend in the federal
courts of cautious, reluctant progress toward recognizing the validity of
comparable worth. Further impetus may come from congressional ac-
tion or from the growing number of state employment laws that contain
some form of comparable worth standard. More than a dozen states
have adopted a state-wide comparable worth standard based upon the
federal Equal Pay Act or Title VII.132 In addition, several states have
comprehensive comparable worth laws applicable to various classifica-
tions of government employees.133
attitudes and concepts that are no longer acceptable under the provisions of Ti-
tle VII.
Id. at 868 n. 17.
126. Id. at 871.
127. St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press, Dec. 11, 1983, at IA, col. 5.
128. Id
129. Minneapolis Star & Trib., Dec. 15, 1983, at 13A, col. 1. The AFSCME decision
could become precedent for additional lawsuits involving almost 10% of America's $1.5
trillion annual civilian payroll. AFSCME also has charges pending before the EEOC
against Hawaii, Wisconsin, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Nassau County, New
York. A suit by AFSCME against Connecticut is pending in federal court. Lauter, Pay
Bias Enters a New Age, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
130. St. Paul Pioneer Press, Dec. 11, 1983, at 1A, col. 5.
131. See St. Paul Sunday Pioneer Press, Jan. 22, 1984, at IA, col. 5. The Reagan ad-
ministration is expected to support Washington if there is an appeal. Lawyers for the
Justice Department contend that wage disparities have existed without discrimination, it
is difficult to evaluate jobs, and it would be difficult to implement comparable worth. Id
132. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(5) (1981); IDAHO CODE § 44-1702(1) (1977);
Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.423(1) (1983); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 628 (1974); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 100, § 55A (1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A (West 1982);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1221(1) (1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-06.1-03 (1980); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 198.1 (West Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (1981); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-12-15 (1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-202(a) (1983); W. VA.
CODE § 21-5B-3(l) (1981). Seegenerally Gasaway,supra note 10, at 1147-49 (discussion of
state actions relating to comparable worth); 3 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) 20,080 (index
of state fair employment legislation).
133. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19827.2 (West Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 67-5309
(Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.01-. 18 (1982). For a further discussion of the Califor-
nia and Minnesota statutes, see infra notes 154-71 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 10
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss3/9
COMPARABLE WORTH
III. MINNESOTA LAW AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Minnesota Statutes
Title VII allows states to enact employment discrimination statutes
that are more comprehensive than the federal laws.134 Nevertheless,
Minnesota's employment discrimination laws are generally equivalent to
the federal law. The state's version of Title VII, the Human Rights Act
(HRA), was enacted in 1955.135 Following the lead of Congress, the
1969 State Legislature amended the act to prohibit sex discrimination. 136
The HRA's section on employment discrimination is almost identical to
the language in Title VII.137 If the alleged violation occurs in a state
such as Minnesota, which has its own substantive and procedural em-
ployment discrimination laws, the EEOC must first notify the appropri-
ate state agency and then allow the state agency roughly sixty days to act
before proceeding on its own. 138 Not only did Minnesota follow Title
VII in enacting the HRA, in 1969 the Minnesota Legislature enacted the
Minnesota Equal Pay Act, which duplicates the federal EPA's require-
134. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1976). Title VII is a minimal standard which states may
exceed so long as state laws are not inconsistent with the federal law. Pursuant to section
2000e-7:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from
any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law
of any State or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which
purports to require or permit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful
employment practice under this subchapter.
Id
135. See Act of Apr. 19, 1955, ch. 516, 1955 Minn. Laws 802 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01-.14 (1982 & Supp. 1983)). The main purpose of the original act,
known as the Minnesota State Act for Fair Employment Practices, was to prohibit em-
ployment discrimination due to "race, color, creed, religion, or national origin." 1955
Minn. Laws 802-03 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 363.12 (1982)).
136. See Act of June 6, 1969, ch. 975, 1969 Minn. Laws 1937 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1 (1982 & Supp. 1983)). "Sex" was added to the Minnesota Human
Rights Act in the wake of the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See generally Auerbach,
The 1969 Amendments to the Minnesota State Act Against Dscrimnatzon and the Uniform Law
Commissioner's Model Anti-Discrimination Act.- Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 55 MINN. L.
REV. 259, 260-64 (1970).
137. See MINN. STAT. § 363.03, subd. 1 (1982 & Supp. 1983). The statute reads in
part: "Except when based on a bona fide occupational qualification, it is an unfair em-
ployment practice. . . [f]or an employer, because of. . . sex. . . to discriminate against
a person with respect to his. . . compensation. . . ." Id § 363.03, subd. 1 (2)(c); see also
supra note 35 (comparable text of Title VII); cf. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 139.40
(1976) (municipal code analogous to Title VII and Chapter 363).
138. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1976). In Minnesota, an aggrieved party may either
file a claim with the Human Rights Commissioner or bring a civil suit directly in state
district court. See MINN. STAT. §§ 363.06, .14 (1982); Wille, Impact OfEqual Employment
Laws, HENNEPIN LAw., Jan.-Feb. 1976, at 4, 6 (it is most efficient to file state and federal
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ment of equal pay for equal work.' 39
B. Minnesota Case Law
Although Title VII provides a minimal standard that states may sur-
pass,1 40 the Minnesota Supreme Court has chosen to abide by the ex-
isting federal standards. In Danz v. Jones, 141 the court construed the
relationship of Title VII to the Human Rights Act.1 42 The plaintiff in
Danz sued her employer for alleged sex discrimination in employment
practices in violation of section 363(1) (2) (c)143 of the HRA. The plaintiff
alleged that her wages were not equal to those of a male employee with
an identical job.144
The central issue in Danz was the proper allocation of the burden of
proof in a wage discrimination case under the HRA. 145 The court stated
that "Chapter 363 appears to be modeled after Title VII. . . .The lan-
guage of [Title VII] is remarkably similar to that of [Chapter] 363."146
The court noted that it previously had referred to decisions construing
Title VII as proper guidelines for decisions under chapter 363,147 and
139. Act of Apr. 17, 1969, ch. 143, 1969 Minn. Laws 228 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 181.66-.68 (1982)). This act provides in part:
No employer shall discriminate between employees on the basis of sex by paying
wages to employees at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employ-
ees of the opposite sex for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to a seniority
system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality
of production, or a differential based on any other factor other than sex.
MINN. STAT. § 181.67, subd. 1 (1982). Compare id with 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976) (text
at supra note 28).
140. See supra note 134.
141. 263 N.W.2d 395 (Minn. 1978).
142. See id. at 398-99.
143. See supra note 137 (containing partial text of § 363.03, subd. 1(2)(c)).
144. Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 397. The defendant in Dan was engaged in the business of
developing, constructing, and managing apartments. Id. at 398. In 1973, the defendant
hired Robert Drake as a rental agent. Id Drake's compensation was a salary of $75 per
week, a $25 commission for each apartment rented, and the choice of one of defendant's
apartments at a particular complex. Id. Later in the same year defendant hired plaintiff
as another rental agent. Her compensation was the same as Drake's except the $75 per
week salary. Id at 398.
145. See id at 398. The trial court held that the plaintiff had the initial burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants had violated chapter 363.
Id The plaintiff argued, however, that the initial burden should only consist of proof that
defendant paid a male employee more than the plaintiff for "substantially equal work."
Id
146. Id at 398-99.
147. Id. at 399 (citing Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. State, 303 Minn. 178,
188, 229 N.W.2d 3, 9 (1975));see also Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428,
441 (Minn. 1983) (principles developed under Title VII by federal courts are instructive
for interpreting chapter 363); Continental Can Co. v. State, 297 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Minn.
1980) (same proposition as Hubbard).
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that federal courts had used the criteria contained in the federal EPA to
adjudicate wage discrimination cases brought under Title VII. 148 There-
fore, the Danz court adopted the four McDonnell Douglas Corporation re-
quirements for establising a federal prima facie case.'
49
According to the United States Supreme Court,50 a prima facie case
occurs when "an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite
sexes 'for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions.' "151 The plaintiff in Danz was granted relief after
proving that she received less pay than a male for equal work under
equal conditions.152 Plaintiffs employer was unable to rebut her prima
facie case.153 Therefore, when a wage discrimination case is brought in
Minnesota under chapter 363, the requisite prima facie showing will be
the same as that in the federal courts for a wage discrimination case
brought under Title VII.
C MInnesota Comparable Worth Law
The most significant action at the state level on comparable worth has
come from the legislatures, not from the courts. Several state legislatures,
including California 154 and Minnesota,155 have recently passed compa-
rable worth laws binding on state employees.1 56 The California statute,
148. Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 399. But see supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (Title
VII wage discrimination claims are not limited by Equal Pay Act standards).
149. Danz, 263 N.W.2d at 399; see supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing
McDonnell). Before Danz, the Minnesota Supreme Court developed a general standard to
be used in discrimination cases in City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 239
N.W.2d 197 (1976). This standard consisted of one of two findings:
(1) an adverse difference in treatment with respect to public services of one or
more persons when compared to treatment accorded others similarly situated
except for the existence of an impermissible factor such as race, color, creed, sex,
etc; or (2) treatment so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated
absent discrimination that discrimination is the probable explanation.
Id. at 87, 239 N.W.2d at 202.
150. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
151. Id at 195.
152. Danw, 263 N.W.2d at 400.
153. See id.
154. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19827.2 (West Supp. 1984). For a brief legislative review
of the statute, see Review of 1981 California Legislation, Pub&i Entities, Ofjcers, andEmploj-
ees," comparable worth salaries, 13 PAC. L.J. 759, 759-60 (1982). Previous California law re-
quired only a consideration of wage rates for comparable state jobs. Id at 759.
155. See MINN. STAT. § 43A.01, subd. 3 (1982); see also infra notes 162-71 and accompa-
nying text (discussion of Minnesota's statute).
156. The Idaho Legislature has also enacted a comparable worth statute applicable to
state government employees which is similar to the California and Minnesota statutes. See
IDAHO CODE § 67-5309B (Supp. 1983). Because of political pressures, easy access to salary
information, and the existence of a larger range of jobs, governmental employers generally
are more willing than private employers to conduct job evaluation studies. This willing-
ness has resulted in more positive action in the public sector. As of late 1983, eighteen
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the first of its kind in the United States, was intended "to establish a state
policy of setting salaries for female-dominated jobs on the basis of the
comparability of the value of the work."'5 7 Relying on the 1980 United
States Department of Labor statistics, the California Legislature con-
cluded that most women work today because of economic necessity; that
women's wages traditionally have been less than those of men because of
job segregation; that sixty percent of women aged eighteen to sixty-four
are working; that two-thirds are either the head of a household or mar-
ried to men who earn less than $10,000 per year; and that historically
women have earned less than men because of lack of education and em-
ployment opportunities, segregation, and underevaluation.158 To allevi-
ate these pay inequities, the California Legislature instructed the state
government to reassess the criteria used to set state employees' wages.1 59
The California statute directs the Department of Personnel Adminis-
tration to compare the value of state jobs within a class or salary range to
the value of other state jobs within another class or salary range. t 60 If
the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions of the jobs are
identical, then the salaries must be equal.161
In 1982, the Minnesota Legislature approved a comparable
worth/equitable compensation statute applicable to state employees in
the executive branch.1 6 2 The statute amended chapter 43A of the Min-
nesota Statutes, entitled "Department of Employee Relations."1 63 Prior
to the enactment of the statute, the Legislature established a task force to
examine ten male-dominated jobs and ten female-dominated jobs. Us-
ing a point system to measure job worth, the task force found overall that
female-dominated jobs in state government received significantly lower
salaries. 164
The Minnesota statute is structurally similar to the California stat-
ute. 165 Both legislatures have outlined a policy of establishing equitable
compensation among female-dominated, male-dominated, and balanced
classes of employees in the executive branch. 166 Female-dominated jobs
states had begun or had completed pay equity studies. See Lauter, Pay Bias Enters a New
Age, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 2, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
157. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19827.2(a) (West Supp. 1984).
158. Id
159. Id § 19827.2(b).
160. Id § 19827.2(c)(2).
161. See id. § 19827.2(c)(3)-(6) (definitions of skill, effort, responsibility, and working
conditions).
162. See Act of Mar. 23, 1982, ch. 634, §§ 1-9, 1982 Minn. Laws 1559-61 (current ver-
sion at MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.01, .02, .05, .08,.18 (1982)).
163. See Act of May 15, 1981, ch. 210, §§ 1-46, 53, 1981 Minn. Laws 702, 702-46, 748
(codified as amended in MINN. STAT. §§ 43A.01-.47 (1982)).
164. Hearing on H.R. 2005 Before Comm. on Governmental Operations (1982).
165. Compare supra notes 158-62 and accompanying text with supra notes 162-64, infra
notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
166. See MINN. STAT. § 43A.01(3) (1982); supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
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contain over seventy percent women; 16 7 male-dominated jobs are over
eighty percent male.168 A balanced class is no more than eighty percent
male and no more than seventy percent female.169
The new Minnesota statute uses the same comparison criteria as the
California statute. 170 These factors aid in determining the value of dif-
ferent jobs. The pay scale for each job requiring the same skill, effort,
responsibility, and working conditions should be equal. For a job requir-
ing skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions proportionate to
another job, the pay scale too should be proportionate.171
The acceptance of comparable worth by Minnesota and other states
should have a significant impact on future federal court decisions ad-
dressing comparable worth claims. The private sector has begun to grap-
ple with the possibility of implementing comparable worth and may
ultimately be moved by notions of pragmatism and equity to adopt com-
parable worth as well. 172 The novelty of comparable worth has disap-
peared; it has become one of the most important ecomonic issues of the
1980's.173 In spite of this growing recognition, however, comparable
worth has yet to achieve nation-wide acceptance. The federal courts re-
main hesitant to interfere in the valuations determined by free market
enterprise. Perhaps the AFSCME decision174 represents the first major
step toward legitimizing a plan for fairness.
IV. BARRIERS REMAINING TO THE PROGRESS OF COMPARABLE
WORTH
Two principal obstacles to implementing comparable worth in the fed-
eral courts remain. First, courts do not want to determine a job's worth
167. MINN. STAT. § 43A.02(22a).
168. Id § 43A.02(27a).
169. Id § 43A.02(6a).
170. Compare MINN. STAT. § 43A.02(14a) (1982) with CAL. GOv'T CODE
§ 19827.2(c)(3)-(6) (West Supp. 1984) (criteria used by both statutes is skill, effort, respon-
sibility and working conditions).
171. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 43A.05(5) (1982). The Minnesota statute provides that
by January 1 of each odd-numbered year the Commissioner of Employee Relations must
submit to the Legislative Commission on Employee Relations a list of inequitably com-
pensated job classifications. Id On March 29, 1983, the Legislative Commission ap-
proved such a list. On June 8, 1983, the Governor signed a bill appropriating nearly
twenty-two million dollars for comparability adjustments pursuant to the list. See Act of
June 8, 1983, ch. 301, § 55, 1983 Minn. Laws 1558, 1622-24. About eighteen million dol-
lars of the legislature's appropriation were distributed to Minnesota's largest public em-
ployees' union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.
AFSCME and the state of Minnesota signed a two-year contract in July 1983 which will
increase wages of over 5000 women. See St. Paul Pioneer Press, July 26, 1983, at I A, col. 6.
172. See Lauter, supra note 156, at 1, col. 1.
173. See Barnett, supra note 16.
174. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text.
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to an employer.175 Second, courts do not want to interfere with the mar-
ketplace. 176 The reluctance of the federal courts, however, has failed to
silence the many commentators who have offered insights into solving
these problems. One of the most notable discussions on job evaluations is
contained in an often-cited 1979 article by Ruth G. Blumrosen.177
Blumrosen suggested a method for measuring a job's worth. Using a job
evaluation system, an employer can internally classify categories of jobs
by common elements.178 Jobs in categories with different contents that
require similar skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions are
graded to objectively determine wage scales. 179 The compensable factors
in each job category are weighted and totaled.18 0 The totals are ranked
in terms of value to the organization.181 Jobs with equal ranking are
paid equally. 182
Many employers in both the public and private sectors use job evalua-
tions of some kind. 183 Nevertheless, courts have not treated them consist-
ently. If a job evaluation plan is available, it may be much easier for a
comparable worth claimant to prove her claim.18 4 For instance, if an
employer compensates male workers but not female workers according to
the plan, the plan may be admissible as evidence of job discrimina-
tion.185 On the other hand, if an employer compensates all workers ac-
cording to the plan, the plan may be challenged as discriminatory.18 6
Generally, comparable worth claimants encounter more problems when
an employer has not conducted a job evaluation. In such a case a court
175. See supra note 101.
176. See infra notes 189-213 and accompanying text.
177. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 397 (1979). Blumrosen's thesis is that job segregation
and wage discrimination are related problems. The same forces that determine that cer-
tain jobs will be female-dominated determine the low economic value of those jobs. Id at
401. Blumrosen believes that the most prevelant characteristic of women's work is job
segregation. It is because of job segregation that women are paid less than men. Id at
415.
178. See id. at 429. According to Blumrosen, there are two steps involved in evaluating
jobs: classifying families ofjobs with common elements and grading jobs with similar skill,
effort, and responsibility that have different contents. Id
179. Id
180. Id at 431. Compensable factors are parts of a job that combine to define a job
and determine its value. Id. The basic premise of compensation systems is that the job
and not the worker is evaluated. Id at 430.
181. Id at 433.
182. Id. at 429.
183. Comment, Comparable Worth Theoy of Title VII Sex Dicrimination in Compensation, 47
Mo. L. REV. 495, 510 (1982).
184. Id at 509. "The most valuable tool for proving sex discrimination in compensa-
tion is, perhaps, the employer's own job evaluation plan." Id
185. Id. at 510.
186. Id at 510-11.
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may be hesitant to conduct its own evaluation.187 On the other hand, an
employer's failure to use an evaluation could work to the company's det-
riment. In 1981, a Pennsylvania federal district court inferred inten-
tional discrimination from an employer's failure to perform an
evaluation. 188
In addition to judicial criticism, job evaluation plans have also been
challenged by legal scholars. An article written in response to Blum-
rosen's article advanced the theory that job evaluation systems were too
susceptible to the individual biases, prejudices, and perceptions inevita-
bly reflected in the weighing process to be objective.189 The controver-
sial nature of job evaluations negates the important role of comparable
worth in adjudicating claims of pay equity.
The second and most troublesome obstacle to acceptance of compara-
ble worth is an employer's use of the marketplace as a defense. The mar-
ket value of a job is that which an employer is willing to pay for the
performance of a specific task and an employee is willing to accept in
payment of that performance. 190 Employers usually establish the worth
or value of a job through the interaction of many factors already present
in the workplace: the market, collective bargaining, economic conditions
and employer policies, technology, societal norms and customs, and dis-
crimination.19 1 The employer in Christensen v. Iowa 192 first used the con-
cept of market value to successfully defend against allegations of pay
inequity in a comparable worth context. Many courts since Christensen
have recognized this argument as a valid defense. 193
187. See, e.g., Power v. Barry County, 539 F. Supp. 721, 726-27 (W.D. Mich. 1982)
(court expressed its inability and unwillingness to evaluate different jobs and determine
their worth to an employer or society and then to determine whether there has been wage
discrimination solely on that basis).
188. See Taylor v. Charley Bros. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 602, 614 (W.D.
Pa. 1981).
189. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Dicrnminatton and the "Comparable Worth" Theory
in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 231, 255 (1980). Job evaluations are crucial to wage
discrimination claims. If the job's worth can not be established, then wage discrimination
loses its meaning. Id at 254. According to Nelson, market value is of no use in detecting
wage discrimination, id at 254, and for purposes of evaluating job worth, neither of the
following theoretical methods is viable: Marginal productivity analysis-measuring the
worth of a job by the value it adds to an enterprise's total output-is too difficult to
manage, id at 257, and job evaluations are too subjective. Id. at 255. The only effective
alternative to measuring the worth of a job is to use its market value. Id at 254-57.
190. Id at 254.
191. See Milkovich & Broderick, Pay Discrimination: Legal Issues and Implications for Re-
search, 21 INDUs. REL. 309, 313 (1982). It is difficult to exclude the market from an opera-
tional definition of value. The value of a job partly depends on its use and what it can
bring in return. A job's value will always be related to the values of the parties who
determine wage scales. Id.
192. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980) (employer may
consider market value of skills of employee when determining salary); Oaks v. City of
1984]
23
et al.: Comparable Worth—Its Status in the Nation and Minnesota
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
The legal justification for an employer's use of the marketplace to de-
fend against charges of wage discrimination is found in the fourth EPA
exception. This exception, incorporated into Title VII by the Bennett
Amendment,1 94 allows an employer to differentiate between men and
women in the payment of wages when the differentiation is based on a
"factor other than sex."195 In Kouba v. A//state Insurance Co., 196 the Ninth
Circuit held that an employer's use of an employee's prior salary to de-
termine starting salary was a "factor other than sex."' 19 7 The impact of
this ruling is significant because historically women were paid less than
men. Many reasons, including the low market value attached to wo-
men's work,19 8 account for this disparity. The Kouba decision allows this
wage discrimination to continue.
It is ironic that past wage discrimination represents a possible defense
to a wage discrimination claim brought under Title VII.199 One com-
mentator has stated that "[i]t is an exercise in futility to outlaw sex-based
wage discrimination and then permit reliance on the market, which has
institutionalized such discrimination, to justify wage disparities between
men and women,"200 At least one lower federal court recognized the
incongruous Kouba rationale. In Futran v. Ring Radio Co., 201 the court re-
jected Kouba, holding that an employee's previous rate of pay was not a
"factor other than sex" because such a characterization would perpetu-
ate past discrimination against working women. 20 2 The Futran court also
stated that paying women lower wages because of the depressed market
Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004, 1040 (S.D. Ala. 1981) (employer must assess market when
determining wages); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Akron Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 497 F. Supp. 733, 751 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (Title VII does not require an em-
ployer to ignore the market in setting pay scales for different work classifications).
194. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 28 (text of Equal Pay Act).
196. 691 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1982). Lola Kouba represented a class of all new female
insurance sales agents. Id at 875. Allstate determined the minimum salary of new agents
"on the basis of ability, education, experience, and prior salary." Id at 874. Kouba al-
leged that it was unlawful sex discrimination for an employer to use a new employee's
prior salary to determine starting salary. Id at 875. Allstate successfully rebutted this
allegation of sex discrimination by providing two business justifications for using prior
salaries to determine starting pay: motivation to increase sales and indication of future
performance. Id at 877-78. The court remanded on the issue of whether Allstate's busi-
ness reasons sufficiently explained the use of prior salary to determine starting pay. Id. at
878.
197. Id at 878.
198. See Note, Proving Title, supra note 89, at 321. Since employers pay their employees
as little as possible and women are willing to accept less in the labor market, women are
paid less than their true worth. Id
199. See Note, Proving Title, supra note 89, at 327.
200. Id
201. 501 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
202. Id. at 739.
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value of their work was impermissible under the EPA and Title VII.203
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed a Ninth Circuit
decision holding that "Title VII has never been construed to allow an
employer to maintain a discriminatory practice merely because it reflects
the marketplace or available options outside the employment con-
text. ' ' 20 4 The plaintiffs in Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris 205 were a
class of all females employed by the state of Arizona who were or would
be enrolled in Arizona's deferred compensation plan.206 The issue in Nor-
rs was whether an employer violated Title VII by offering retirement
benefits from companies it selected that permitted smaller monthly an-
nuity payments to female employees than to male employees contribut-
ing the same amount. 207 The Court held that this practice violated Title
VII.208 The employer's responsibility for wages, terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment did not justify the adoption of a benefit plan
that discriminated among its employees on the basis of sex regardless of
third parties' involvement in the discrimination.209 Norri's may provide
ammunition for an employee to combat an employer's use of the "mar-
ketplace defense" in comparable worth cases.
Blumrosen offers another argument against wage discrimination based
on the premise that women have traditionally held a low status within
society. As a consequence of this lower status, both sexes value men's
activities more highly than women's activities and cause women's wages
in female-dominated areas to be lower.210 According to Blumrosen, a
plaintiff claiming wage discrimination under Title VII should have to
prove only that she works in a female-dominated area, 2 11 thereby creat-
ing a presumption that her wages have been discriminatorily sup-
pressed. 2 12 The burden of proof would then shift to the plaintiff's
203. Id
204. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm., 671 F.2d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 1982), af'd in
part, rev'd i part, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983) (per curiam).
205. 103 S. Ct. at 3492.
206. Id at 3493.
207. Id
208. Id
209. Id at 3501 (Marshall, J., concurring in part). But see supra note 107 and accompa-
nying text (employer not liable for discriminatory acts of marketplace). The Noris Court
in part based its holding on City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702 (1978). InManhart, the Court held that it was unlawful sex discrimination for an
employer to require higher pension fund contributions from women simply because on the
average women live longer than men. Id at 711.
210. See Blumrosen, supra note 177, at 416.
211. Id at 459.
212. Id at 490. Classic economic theory holds that wage discrimination in a free com-
petitive market is impossible. Numerous studies show, however, that wage discrimination
is an imperfection in this system. When community wage scales are used to determine
wages in a female-dominated area, discrimination is probably a negative influence on the
value given to that job. Id at 446, 459.
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employer who must either rebut the inference or justify the lower wage
as a business necessity. 2 13 In other words, an employer violates Title VII
by adopting a wage scale based on the marketplace since the market-
place reflects past discrimination. If, according to Norris, it is unlawful
sex discrimination for an employer to choose a retirement plan that
treats women differently because they are women, then it should be an
unlawful act of sex discrimination for an employer to choose a wage
scale, such as the marketplace, that treats women differently because
they are women. Notwithstanding persuasive arguments to the contrary,
however, the marketplace defense remains controversial.
The future of comparable worth is plagued by an obstacle beyond the
difficulties inherent in using job evaluations and in overcoming the mar-
ketplace defense: the high monetary cost of implementing comparable
worth. As noted previously, it has been estimated that it would cost one
hundred and fifty billion dollars per year to increase the wages of full-
time women workers to the level of the average full-time male workers'
salaries. 2 14 The tremendous economic implications of such a policy
could cripple the economy. 21 5 If comparable worth were accepted na-
tionwide, private employers and the government would have to bear
heavy financial burdens including regulatory expenses and litigation
costs. 21 6 In addition, the payment of higher wages to women in the ab-
sence of increased productivity would result in massive inflation. 2 17 Con-
ceivably, employers would opt to avoid increased labor costs by
exporting many women's jobs.218
The economic effects of increased pay equity could also prove detri-
mental to female employees. Only women who worked for an employer
with both female-dominated and male-dominated job categories would
benefit from increased wages. 219 Non-working women and women per-
forming male-dominated jobs would not benefit economically.220 It is
questionable whether such a redistribution of income would have a great
positive impact on either the economy or society.221 The implementa-
213. Id at 490. A later article noted Blumrosen's thesis and channeled her prima facie
Title VII comparable worth claim into three steps. A plaintiff is required to show that:
(1) her job is comparable to a predominantly male job; (2) there is a pay disparity; and (3)
this disparity adversely affects women employees as a group or that women are intention-
ally paid less than men. See Note, Equal Pay, Comparable Work, andJob Evaluation, 90 YALE
L.J. 657, 677 (1981).
214. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
217. See Nelson, Opton & Wilson, supra note 189, at 293.
218. Id at 291-92. Many female-dominated jobs, such as clothing manufacturing, can
be performed overseas at a much lower cost. Id at 291.
219. Id. at 294.
220. Id This group's purchasing power would suffer. Id
221. Id. Nelson, Opton, and Wilson believe that income would be largely redis-
tributed to single women without small children. Id
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tion of comparable worth also threatens to impair job integration. Wo-
men would no longer be motivated to enter traditionally male fields by
the prospect of higher pay rates.222 In summary, it is uncertain whether
the economic cost of full-scale implementation of comparable worth
would outweigh the benefit to be gained from pay equity.
V. CONCLUSION
Comparable worth remains one of the most controversial employment
questions of the 1980's. The Gunther decision allows federal courts to
reach beyond Equal Pay Act standards in wage discrimination cases. Al-
though few courts since Gunther have upheld wage discrimination chal-
lenges based on notions of comparable worth, the need for timely and
consistent action is apparent.
Legislative implementation of comparable worth in the public sector
has served to stimulate public awareness of the problems inherent in pay
equity issues. Legislative enactments may ultimately cause the private
sector to adopt wage scales that more accurately reflect the comparable
worth of female employees, if only to compete with the higher wages
paid in the public sector.
Comparable worth will continue to be an issue of major political, eco-
nomic, and social import. Many private employers may voluntarily im-
plement comparable worth to avoid the cost of inevitable litigation.
Despite the problems and obstacles that comparable worth has con-
fronted, a slow but favorable wave of recognition seems to be pushing
comparable worth toward greater acceptance.
222. Id at 297.
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